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The debate surrounding the ideological underpinning of the
Australian Labor Party (ALP) has been a constant companion to the
development of policy both in government and in opposition since
the Parties origins in the 1890s. The privatisation debate ofthe 1980s
saw the Hawke governments come under sustained criticism for the
shifting of the Party to the right and for the betrayal of the Labor
tradition. This paper will examine the privatisation debate in the light
ofthis concept of tradition, and its usefulness to historians in trying
to gain an insight into the motivations of the protagonists of the
time. The fundamental nature of the privatisation debate to the
understanding of what the ALP actually stands for makes it an
important and controversial subject for labour historians. Much
previous work in this area, due not least to the closeness ofthe era to
current writing, has been of a highly politicised and partisan nature.
A more sober overview of this crucial debate within the Labor Party,
focussing less on whether Hawke was right, and more on the impact
of the debate on the positioning of 1980s Labor in relation to its past
is necessary. This paper will argue that an awareness of the
complexities and contradictions of the concept of tradition is essential
to the study of this debate, and that an understanding of the
evolutionary nature of this tradition is needed to link the Hawke
governments of this era to Labor governments of the past.
There are many competing views as to what constitutes the Labor
tradition, and it will be argued in this paper that there is no one true
tradition. However an example of some popular concepts of the Labor
tradition will help clarity the argument. In Transforming Labor, Peter
Beilharz argues that there are three main "golden ages" of Labor
history focused on by different groups within the Party.' Some look
to the Party's formation in the period of the Great Strikes of the
1890s as what Beilharz describes as a " ... foundation of fire" and the
moment when Labor was closest to its working class origins. 2 Others
look to the 1940s and the Curtin and Chifley governments as the
"golden age" of full employment and opportunities of post-war
reconstruction. 3 Still others see the Whitlam era of the early 1970s
as the benchmark. 4 These periods are idealised and romanticised and
are then used to measure present incarnations.
Eric Hobsbawm defines this as "inventing tradition" and suggests
that, "[i]n short, they are responses to novel situations which take
the form of reference to old situations, or which establish their own
past by quasi-obligatory repetition".5 The privatisation debate of the
1980s saw this concept of tradition mobilised by both sides in arguing
for a more market oriented approach to the ownership of Government
Business Enterprises (GBE), or in appealing to an interventionist
past. That privatisation is now part of the Labor tradition is an
example of the evolutionary nature of these "invented traditions", if
one that many contemporary members feel uncomfortable with.
In examining the Hawke governments relationship to any Labor
tradition, an understanding of what the Party had committed itself to
by the time of the 1983 Federal election, particularly in relation to
public ownership, is essential. The 1982 ALP Platform began with
the statement of the "Objectives", committing the Party to " ... the
democratic socialisation of industry, production, distribution and
exchange, to the extent necessary to eliminate exploitation
and other anti-social features in these fields".6 Does this
objective commit the Party to public ownership? If this is

ambiguous, section two would appear to be more explicit, committing
the Party to the "establishment and development of public enterprises,
based upon federal, state and other forms of social ownership, in
appropriate sectors of the economy".? The 1982 Conference that had
developed this Platform had however passed a resolution that gave
the incoming Hawke government some freedom. Policies geared
toward producing a "sustained economic recovery" were to be given
precedence over all other Platform commitments. 8 This was to prove
a significant caveat.
The future arguments within the Party dealing with privatisation
were to centre on this commitment to public ownership, both
"traditionally" and explicitly in the Platform, and the need for those
arguing for privatisation to convince the Party to change the Platform
to allow for major enterprise sales. With the focus of the Hawke
government's shortened first term being the deregulation of the
finance and banking sector and the establishment of the Accord, it
was during the second term that the privatisation debate emerged as
a central and divisive issue. The Coalition had begun highlighting
the potential for the privatisation of public enterprises such as
Australian Airlines (orTAA in the early 1980s), Qantas and Medibank
Private, with at least the deregulation of Telecom under consideration
by the 1984 Federal election. In 1985 the Liberal Party committed
itself to the sale of the Housing Loans Insurance Corporation, the
Australian Industry Development Corporation and Medibank Private,
and to examining other enterprises including the Commonwealth
Bank. 9
Labor attacked the Coalition's policy at this time, with senior
figures including Hawke and Keating making strong statements
reaffirming Labor's commitment to public ownership and opposition
to any "Thatcherite" privatisation plans. In a quote that was to be
consistently used against his later pro-privatisation arguments, Hawke
stated in July 1985 that the proposed sale of assets by the Liberal
Party would be" ... a one-offfire sale; a 'sale of the century' of your
assets, the assets of the people of Australia. They would transfer
them into the hands of a privileged few to the cost of every one of
us".'o Keating also went on the record in May 1985 stating that: "No
matter where one looks whether it be at TAA or the other authorities
there is no case for the Opposition's argument in economics except
simply to indulge ideologically in a Thatcherite vandalistic splurge
to try and destroy these authorities"."
By early 1986 however changes began to appear publicly at the
top levels of the ALP in its attitude toward the privatisation issue.
Minister for Finance Senator Peter Walsh made a speech to a seminar
on the topic of privatisation organised by the Financial Review for
February 26, 1986 in which he stated that" ... if its cheaper to put
the control of operations of public enterprises into private hands,
then I'd like to do it that way".'2 Walsh went on to suggest that he
had no particular ideological preference for public or private
ownership, and that he was disappointed that people were allowing
the privatisation debate to become "politicised and polarised".13
"Those at the conservative end of the spectrum want to privatise
everything that moves. Some at the progressive end s~em to favour
public ownership at all costs, simply because the conservatives
want privatisation".14 Walsh was not suggesting wholesale
privatisation of GBE in this speech, in fact making the point
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that selling off the "good performers" and leaving those with worse
balance sheets was a major flaw in the opposition's approach, but it
was a significant public shift in emphasis from a significant figure
within the Cabinet.
The June 1986 policy discussion paper Statutory Authorities and
Government Business Enterprises; Proposed Policy Guidelines,
echoed the tenor of Walsh's February speech in calling for a more
rational, less "ideological" debate. 15 As an official statement of future
policy direction this provides greater evidence of the government's
thinking. It again criticises those who "". seem to favour public
ownership at all cost ... " and establishes the guidelines for the future
control of GBE along deregulated, "market - oriented" lines. 16 The
paper goes on to state that: "The proposed approach to government
business enterprises has three specific components: the preparation
of strategic plans including financial performance objectives; a
reduction in direct controls over the day to day operations of
enterprises; and improved quality of information for the assessment
of enterprise performance". 17 The first two of these were of particular
significance to the broader debate in that the government was both
deregulating in terms of its direct control over the enterprises, and
through setting financial objectives, demanding a commercial rate
of return.
Thus by 1986 the Hawke government had made significant
strides toward the deregulation of the public sector and the framework
for the major skirmishes within the Party over the issue in the lead
up to the 1988 National Conference had been laid. In calling for the
removal of "ideology" from the debate, and in implicitly
acknowledging the need for a more market oriented approach to the
management of major public enterprises the Hawke ministry would
appear to be moving away from adherence to any "socialist objective"
in regard to public ownership. While not at this stage calling for
actual privatisation, the shift in approach toward the GBE was seen
by many as a step in that direction and from mid 1986 onward, the
privatisation debate was well under way within the ALP.
1987 was to prove a key year in the development of the
privatisation debate. On the first of April the Prime Minister
announced in response to a question in Parliament that the Labor
government would be considering the "disposal of some public
assets". 18 "I simply say to the Leader of the Opposition that, unlike
the Opposition, my Government is not a captive of any privatisation
ideology. We have adopted a calm and reasoned approach on this
matter."19 He went on to suggest that the needs of the economy and
the community changed over time and that part of a "normal Budget
process" was to assess all public expenditure and asset~.20
Hawke was preparing the way for the asset sales that were to be
announced in the Economic Statement of 13th May, 1987. This
statement of Budget Initial Measures announced one billion dollars
worth of asset sales, including the sale of Williamstown Naval
Dockyard; the sale of part of Australia's Embassy site in Tokyo and
the former Ambassadors residence in Paris, among other
Commonwealth holdings. 21 Reflecting Hawke's statement quoted
above, the actual Budget paper itself states that "These sales are part
of a sensible ongoing review of assets and holdings which the
Government has been undertaking over recent years. They have not
been motivated by any ideological view like some privatisation
campaigns overseas".22
The 1987 election was called on 27th May, and shortly after the
election victory the Prime Minister declared himself in favour of
examining the potential for privatisation of the GBE, not just the
'assets and holdings' so far announced. The election having been on
11 th July, by mid August the anti-privatisation forces within
the Party and the broader labour movement began a more
concerted public campaign of opposition. Senior Vice-

1

President of the ACTU and Secretary of the NSW Labor Council
John MacBean suggested on 16th August that the union movement
would "call for the scrapping of the prices and incomes accord if the
government moved forward on any planned major enterprise sales",
and that the "view of the ACTU executive was 'bloody near'
unanimous".23 The Victorian ALP conference on the weekend of the
15th and 16th of August had passed a motion condemning any sell
off of major enterprises such as Australian Airlines, Qantas, Australia
Post, Telecom and the Commonwealth Bank. 24 As holder of a
Victorian seat the message could not have been clearer to Hawke.
However the plans of Hawke and Keating for further asset sales
remained unclear. The crux of the argumentjorpotential privatisation
presented by Hawke was that the need to reduce government spending
and the need to restrict public sector borrowing as a drain on available
finance and levels of debt, may inhibit the growth of GBE and reduce
their efficiency and value to the public. 25 The government could not
afford to simultaneously inject large quantities of capital into
enterprises such as the airlines and fund initiatives in the social
security and health areas.
With the next National Conference of the Party set for June 1988
the leadership pushed hard to gain support for a change to the Platform
to allow for privatisation. The major figures that indicated support
at least for debating the issue included Hawke and Keating
themselves, Finance Minister Walsh, Senate Leader John Button,
and the new Transport and Communications Minister Gareth Evans.
Evans was to do much of the work to deregulate the airline industry;
in particular drawing up the bill to end the Two-Airlines Agreement
that was introduced on 7th October 1987. It was Evans who was to
most clearly articulate the need for capital injections to run the major
GBE successfully, and to argue strongly in the lead up to June 1988
that the party should at least consider the relaxation of its opposition
to privatisation.
Despite the support of these powerful figures privatisation was
opposed strongly from within the Cabinet itself. Administrative
Services Minister Stewart West was quoted as having attacked
privatisation plans in a speech delivered to a conference ofthe Left
in Canberra in October 1987.26 West suggested that public enterprises
could be made more efficient without recourse to sale, and that the
money they required could be financed by borrowing without placing
any more pressure on money markets than would private sector
borrowings. 27 Outside Cabinet, other Labor members of parliament
made strong anti-privatisation speeches in the House. 2B Clearly there
was a significant coalition of opposition to privatisation among both
the Parliamentary Party and the broader Labour movement. A motion
by the Centre Left of the Party moved in Caucus in November of
1987 by Senator Peter Cook calling on ministers to provide reports
on ways of securing the capital needs of major GBE while
maintaining full public ownership, almost ended the debate at this
point. Only a last minute compromise under heavy pressure from
Hawke personally, (it was claimed he lobbied Cook during a plane
flight!), managed to secure an agreement to keep debate alive "to
ensure a wider public understanding of the issues involved".29
The Conference of early June then was one overshadowed by
the divisions over the privatisation issue. A comprehensive defeat
for the party leader on the floor of the Conference was not something
the Party could afford politically while in government, and with the
numbers against any change to the platform and with Hawke having
led the debate publicly a compromise had to be found. To save face
for the Parliamentary leadership of the Party a compromise was
moved by Senator Michael Beahan of the Centre Left faction, and
seconded by Senator Evans of the Right to refer the question
of how to fund the capital requirements of the two publicly
owned airlines, (no other enterprises), to a cross factional
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committee. 30 This committee could consider all options including
full or partial privatisation, but if these were to be promoted a Special
Conference would need to be called to allow for any changes to the
Platform to be debated. 31 This was passed ahead ofa motion put by
the Left arguing for an end to the divisive privatisation debate and
recognition of the Party's traditional commitment to public
ownership.32 The numbers were not there to change Labor's policy
commitment rejecting privatisation, but the faction system was able
to secure a compromise deal that seemed to be a defeat for just about
everybody, but importantly for the pro-privatisation forces, kept the
debate alive.
While leaving the headlines for some time after the Conference,
the debate dragged on within the PartY and was reignited publicly
by Hawke's post 1990 election commitment to the pursuit of microeconomic reform in the telecommunications sector. The cross
factional committee of the 1988 compromise motion was never to
report but the push to end Telecom's monopoly position, in
conjunction with plans to partially privatise the airlines, and the deal
with Victoria that led to the sale of one third of the Commonwealth
Bank, resulted in the calling ofthe Special Conference to change the
Platform. 33 The partial privatisation of the Commonwealth Bank to
fund the purchase of the ailing State Bank of Victoria was in fact
secured before the Special Conference called for 24th September had
debated the proposed changes to the ALP Platform to allow for
privatisation. The deal was incredibly neat in simultaneously allowing
for partial privatisation of the Commonwealth Bank, saving the
Victorian ALP government from financial disaster, and presenting
an almost unarguable case for privatisation to a left wing Premier.
Keating's office was reported in The Age of 25 th August as saying
" ... honestly, there's no trick".34 Keating had been able to move
quickly in securing the deal before full party approval by arguing
the urgent financial necessity of the change and that in his reading
of the platform it wasn't controversial as it was expanding the size
and influence of the Commonwealth Bank and that it was still in
majority public ownership.35
Less than a month out from the Special Conference that would
have to make the decision regarding the ALP's policy toward
privatisation, the Commonwealth Bank deal complicated the debate,
but crucially for those promoting change, forced the Party to accept
change in the enterprise perhaps most valued. As Michelle Grattan
argued in The Age, " .. .if a third or nearly half of the hallowed
Commonwealth Bank goes, is it much use fretting over 49 percent
of Qantas?"36 In the end, the Conference was still very hard fought,
with the Party exhibiting strong divisions over the issue within
parliament in the weeks leading up to it37, and on the Conference
floor. The debate was described as "heaping insult upon insult"38
with Barry Jones saying there were" ... more dead sacred cows here
than in an abattoir".39 The Cabinet proposals to alter the
telecommunications monopoly, to privatise AUSSAT and to allow
for the forty-nine percent privatisation of Qantas and one hundred
percent of Australian Airlines were all eventually accepted. The
telecommunications reforms were the hardest won, with the vote
being fifty-eight for to forty-three against40 . The Airlines changes
were passed sixty to thirty-nine. 41 The Commonwealth Bank deal
was not extensively debated having already been announced.
While initially only authorising the sale of Australian Airlines
and forty-nine percent of Qantas, by June 1992 it had been announced
that Qantas would purchase Australian Airlines as part of a merger
deal, and would then be sold in its entirety.42 Twenty-five percent of
the merged airline was sold in a trade sale to British Airways in
March 1993, with the remaining seventy-five percent being
held back by the government until 1995:3The Commonwealth
Bank, perhaps the most controversial of the major asset sales

was initially intended to have only thirty percent private ownership.
By August of 1993 a Bill was introduced to the House to sell down
a further nineteen percent, and in October 1995 the Keating
government introduced the Bill that was to see one hundred percent
of the bank sold. 44 The telecommunications reforms announced as
part of the package approved by the Special Conference of 1990
were passed with some Senate amendments, but no further sale of
Telecom was undertaken by the Labor government. In the ten years
that had elapsed between the strong condemnation by Hawke and
Keating of the Opposition's privatisation policies as" a one off fire
sale", and" ... a vandalistic splurge" the government had engineered
the full sale of Australian Airlines, Qantas and the Commonwealth
Bank, among other less symbolically important assets such as the
Commonwealth Serum Laboratories and the Williamstown Naval
Dockyard.
The privatisation debate can then be seen to have been at the
centre of claims of a "sell out" of Labor tradition by the Hawke
governments of the 1980's, and furthered under Keating after 1991.
The issue of Labor's commitment to public ownership was seen by
many to be at the core of what it meant to "be Labor". Hawke's view
may have been that "over time, clearly, the needs of the economy
and the community generally change and so too will an efficient use
of public capital",45 but by the Special Conference of 1990 he was
unable to convince many within the Federal Parliamentary Caucus,
let alone the broader labour movement. In speeches to the House in
the two weeks leading up to the 1990 Special Conference, Left wing
figures such as Stewart West and Frank Walker argued strenuously
against privatisation. West argued that any large scale privatisation
program would place "heavy demands on domestic savings and
means a certain increase to our already overloaded foreign debt".46
Frank Walker's speech went further, calling into question the
leadership's commitment to Labor's heritage and damning its "blind
faith in the inherent value of competition",41 Walker wondered
whether " ... these admittedly fundamental economic changes
constitute a permanent catapulting of Labor deep into the spectrum
of right wing politics or merely a temporary aberration during tough
times. 48
Hawke tried consistently during the debate to negate this line of
argument by emphasising the lack of "ideology" in his approach.
For Hawke and other pro-privatisation figures such as Evans, Walsh
and Keating the issue was less an argument of Labor adopting a
"New-Right" free-market approach to the issue, and more about a
pragmatic choice between the need to spend scarce public funds on
buying new aircraft for Qantas and Australian Airlines, and spending
on welfare and social justice programs. In attempting to differentiate
his position, and by his definition Labor's, from the Opposition's
privatisation plans Hawke added, "The difference between us will
be one of ideology. Our change will be based upon the proposition
that we need to have competition in the telecommunications sector,
including retaining a fully publicly owned telecommunications
facility. That will distinguish us from the Opposition" .49
It is this question of the capacity to remove "ideology" from the
privatisation debate that seems to be so problematic. The ideology
that Hawke was referring to was the Coalition's commitment to the
economic theories of the "New-Right", however those critical ofthe
Party under Hawke's leadership, including people like Frank Walker
and Stewart West from within its ranks, were bemoaning the influence
of this "free market" ideology on 1980's Labor. Not only did the
Hawke government appear to be moving the party away from any
"socialist objective", it was accepting many of the pro-private
enterprise beliefs that this objective was accepted as opposing.
This was most marked in its decision to sell government
enterprises .
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The privatisation debate was then central to the Party's
understanding of who they were and what they represented. Concepts
of tradition are central to this understanding, and the privatisation
debate can be seen to have chaIlenged some of the longest held
elements of these traditions. In looking at the Party platform
documents as they developed over the century, the recurring theme
stated up front in the Objective from 1921 onward was the
commitment to "socialisation". The "socialist" nature of this
commitment has been a source of debate and not little disappointment
to many, seeing "socialisation" as shorthand for "nationalisation",
but it was at least assumed to confer a commitment to the public
ownership of the major enterprises that had been established. The
Commonwealth Bank had been founded by Labor in 1912 and the
Chifley government of the 1940's had seen Qantas come under
government control and the domestic airline, TAAset up as a publicly
owned competitor to the privately owned Ansett.5o The failed attempt
to fully nationalise the banks by the same government, and the role
played by the constitution in thwarting Chifley's aims has become a
further raIlying point for those in the Party claiming Labor's
commitment to public ownership as fundamental to the Labor
tradition.
If the extent of Labor's commitment to its Socialist Objective
has been a matter of long term debate, the role played by public
ownership as a manifestation of Labor's commitment to
"socialisation" must then come under similar question. In their
examination ofthe socialist objective as it stood in 1980, both Evans
and Reeves argue that "socialisation" was intended to mean more
than a literal translation to "nationalisation" and that in any event
the Constitutional impediments of Section 92 as used against the
Chifley government's nationalisation plans had made any hopes for
a radical shift from private sector ownership of industry to public
impossible. 5! Reeves suggests that Labor's response to this
constitutional impediment to its plans was to establish public
enterprises in competition with similar private sector enterprises and
that this was " ... an exceIlent way of having effective general
economic management by the government within the area".52 Thus
while stopped from any path to complete nationalisation, the Party
could still establish active public enterprises. 53
The privatisation debate brought into sharp focus the question
of the ALP's commitment to its Objective, and raised the question
of what did it stand for by the end of the 1980's? As Hughes and
Emy put it "Even if no-one seriously argued for socialisation or
nationalisation any more; even if economic realities had changed,
the ALP still stood for public enterprise. With this gone, many now
wonder what the party stands for".54 The question of the ideological
underpinning of the Party, despite Hawke's attempts to avoid or
marginalise it as an issue, were thrown into stark relief through the
push to change the Party's platform in the 1980's. Whether Hawke
saw his Party as having an "ideological" debate or not, the distance
created by the privatisation issue between platform, tradition and
policy centred on questions of ideology.
So what were the motivating factors behind Labor's change in
policy direction during the 1980's? In terms of the specific
privatisation issue, the reasons outlined by Hawke, Walsh, Evans
and others during the debate centred on the capital requirements of
the big public enterprises, and the inability of government in trying
to "balance" the Budget and restrain public sector debt, funding both
social policy areas and the needs of airlines and banks. Competition
and efficiency of service provision were also promoted as factors in
favour of privatisation, but these arguments were seized on by
opponents as being achievable through deregulation and the
setting up of public enterprise along more "market-oriented"
lines. 55 The government's own guidelines for GBE as released

in June 1986 in discussion paper form, and finalised by November
1987, argued along these lines, as discussed earlier. Privatisation
was however just one of the more controversial examples ofa wider
trend of a movement away from the interventionist tradition of
Australian governance. The deregulation ofthe finance industry was
another significant example of the "liberalisation" ofthe Australian
economy that was begun during the Hawke government's tenure,
and continued into the 1990's.
There were other significant factors leading the Hawke
governments to liberalise the economy. Michael Pusey has argued
that the role of senior public servants in promoting liberalisation
played a very influential part.56 In conducting a sociological study
of the upper echelons of the Commonwealth public service Pusey
found not a group of apolitical "centrists", but an influential body of
people pursuing a strong "free market" agenda. 57 Pusey argued that:
"It may be that the bureaucracy have corralled the reformist and
economically oriented Hawke government into a narrowing and
increasingly exclusive commitment to an "economic rationalism'
that is at odds with the broad thrust of the ALP's policies. "58 In
response to Pusey's questionnaires asking, among other things, what
these members of the Commonwealth Senior Executive Service
thought were the most pressing problems facing Australia in the mid
1980's, around two-thirds saw economic difficulties as being of most
concern and Pusey states: " ... there was an inward smile of approval
towards the policies of Mrs Thatcher or Mr Reagan in the early 1980's
and an underlying assumption that the standard for testing the worth
of a politician ought to be the vigour with which they cleared the
way for economic change".59
By itself, Pusey's thesis doesn't necessarily explain the changes
in policy approach by the Hawke government during the 1980 's, but
it does show that one of the government's strongest sources of advice
and assistance in policy formulation was leaning toward ''New-Right''
arguments. The editorials of major newspapers covering the
privatisation debate at the time also betray an acceptance of a "freemarket" approach to the issue. In writing of the opposition within
the ALP to the potential for the sale of public enterprises, The
Australian of 24th November, 1987 stated: "In any case, it is not the
role of the government to run a business or worse, impede the
development of one with regulations designed to protect a
monopoly."60 It went on: "Governments should get on with the job
of governing undisturbed by the problems of running banks, airlines
or telephone companies".6! In its reportage of the 1988 National
Conference TheAustralian of 8th June, 1988 savaged the opposition
within the Party to the platform changes saying: "It demonstrates
that even though the Labor Party has changed a great deal in recent
years its blinkered ideological outlook can still stand in the way of
sensible reform. There is no reason in principle, and no justification
in terms of efficiency or equity for the Government to run enterprises
such as airlines, or banks. The private sector can do it more efficiently
and competitively".62 The Age of 6th June, 1988 espoused a similar
opinion suggesting: "In the name of economic management, the
Government has no choice but to press ahead with moves to cut the
cost and raise the efficiency of public enterprises ... ".63
Given that the Coalition, especially the Liberal Party moved
further to the Right during the 1980's in trying to assert their position
as the true Party of private enterprise, the picture that emerges is that
of a strong impetus to an acceptance of the "rationality" of a more
liberal, "free market" approach to government. Through a union of
the senior public service, sections of the media and their political
opposition the ALP was under significant pressure to accept the "free
market" approach as the pragmatic, rational approach to
solving Australia's economic problems. Governments do not
work in a vacuum, and are products of both their traditions,
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and the prevailing discourse of the time. The Hawke government in
particular, coming into office at a time of recession and with the
rhetoric of being the agent of "reconciliation" and "recovery"
prominent in it's campaign, was open to ideas that while perhaps
antithetical to ALP tradition, were presented as being pragmatic and
rational in the circumstances.
In Transforming Labor, Peter Beilharz describes the years 19831993 as being an era of "innovation and exhaustion in Australian
politics".64 The ALP took on the role of attempting to modernise the
Australian economy and its political framework from what Beilharz
refers to as its "settler-capitalist" tradition, in response to the challenge
of "the global system".6S He suggests that in the process they "emptied
out" the Labor tradition and Labor as a result were "transformed".66
This paper argues that rather than "emptying out" the Labor tradition
in achieving the "transformation" of the 1980's, the Hawke
government accentuated the pragmatic strain present in this tradition.
That there are significant differences between the Hawke Labor
government's "free market" approach, and the Labor heritage of a
more "interventionist" economic outlook is obvious, however to try
and establish the concept of a Labor tradition without including the
Party's longest period of office is to render the term redundant. The
Hawke governments of the 1980s "transformed" Labor, not least in
terms of changing the Party's commitment to public ownership. The
length and divisiveness ofthe privatisation debate brought into sharp
focus the changes being wrought to the Party's concept of what it
stood for, and highlighted the exhaustion of the commitment to any
"socialist objective".
In using tradition as a link between a view of the past, and the
needs of the present, an acceptance of the complexities and
contradictions of the concept is necessary. It is useful to historians
attempting to understand the difficulties and divisions faced by the
ALP in dealing with the privatisation issue in that it helps explain
the baggage carried into the debate by various sides. Ifpragmatism
and dealing with accepted "realities" were the only motivating forces
behind political action then an issue like the debate over public
ownership would not have been so divisive. That much of the Party
saw the privatisation question in terms of a "selling out" of Labor
tradition requires us to try and examine what lies behind this concept.
That there may be significant complexities and contradictions to
acknowledge does not negate its usefulness. These complexities help
us in looking back to appreciate the emotions involved in the debate,
and the motivations of the various actors.
The Hawke government did then "hi-jack" the Labor Party in
the 1980s. It didn't however step in from some "other realm" and
transform a previously pure political entity. The Labor Party has
always argued amongst itself as to what its "true" direction should
be. As can be seen by the current 1998 Platform, the ALP has been
"transformed" to some degree by the changes of the I 980s,67 Gone
is the "socialist objective" and any reference to "socialisation".68 In
its place are a series of references to the challenges of "global is ation",
and a commitment to " ... an effective and efficient public sector
operating in partnership with a thriving private sector ... ".69 Thus the
Party and platform have evolved. Whether they are able to take their
supporters with them into the future remains to be seen.
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